Abstract: Accordingt oR einhartK oselleck, the period he calls Sattelzeit,which spans from 1730 through 1850,w itnessed ac rucial conceptual transformation. It was associated with an ew, 'modern' wayo fe xperiencing temporality,which in turn gave rise to the emergence of the concept of History as as ingular collective noun and, consequently, to the philosophies of history.K oselleck'sperspective converges, besides, with Michel Foucault'sv iewi nTheO rder of Things,i n which Foucault also remarked on the great conceptual break thato ccurred around 1800 and gave rise to the emergence of what he called the 'Ageo fH istory'.However,our attempt at matchingK oselleck's Begriffsgeschichte with Foucault'sa rchaeological perspective willa lsor eveal whyt he former is not yets ufficientlya ttentive to the diversity of the modes of conceiving of temporality duringt he four centuries that modernity spans. Lastly, it willa llow us to better understand what was the intellectual ground on which the philosophies of history weref ounded, and also how it eventuallyb ecame undermined, along with the concept of temporality thatw as at its basis.
Iamalways terrified when Ihear in afew words awhole nation or atime, for what agreat multitude of differences does not comprehend the wordn ation, or the middle ages or antiquity and the modern epoch! (Johann Gottfried Herder) Reinhart Koselleck'sc oncept of Sattelzeit has become an inevitable point of referencew henever one seeks to understand the origin of modernity from the perspective of intellectual history.Itoffers ahighlysuggestive view of the great conceptual transformation produced between 1750 and 1850-the period he calls Sattelzeit. AccordingtoKoselleck, this conceptual transformation was closelyassociated with ag iven wayo fe xperiencing temporality,w hich gave rise to the emergence of the concept of History,a sasingular collective noun. As he shows, that concept would have been incomprehensible before 1750.T os peak of 'History' without further ado, as if it wereakind of macrosubject,w ould have been simplyu nintelligible for ap erson of the fifteenth or even the seventeenth century.T he emergence of the philosophieso fh istory was the consequence of this conceptual transformation, as the two wereclosely tied: as Hein-rich Köster then said, "History means the same as historical theory or philosophy of history or as the logic of history" (quoted in Koselleck 2006,p.7 4) . Historical philosophyt hus has ap recise historical-conceptual basis, and becomes meaningful onlyw ithin that giveni ntellectual configuration; it has no meaningo utside of it.Ins hort,what this reveals is the contingent nature of the foundations of the philosophieso fh istory,a nd of the concept of temporality thatu nderlies them. Koselleck'sp erspective converges with Michel Foucault'sv iew in TheO rder of Things (Foucault 1970) . In it,F oucault also remarked on the great conceptual break that occurred around 1800 and gave rise to the emergence of what he called the 'Ageo fH istory'.F oucault associated it,i nt urn, with the appearance of ac ertain concept of 'Subject'.B oth concepts (Subject and History) would be closelyl inked. The latter would be no more than another translation of the former,a nd ultimatelyt he twoa re the expression of the new wayo fe xperiencing the temporality thatbothF oucault and Koselleck identify as distinctiveof'modernity'.
However,o ur attempt at matchingK oselleck's Begriffsgeschichte with Foucault'sa rchaeological perspective willa lsor eveal whyt he former is not yets ufficientlyattentive to the diversity of the modes of conceiving of temporality during the four centuries thatm odernity spans. Actually, it can discern onlyt wo possiblet ime-concepts, each of which will be separated by that great epochal rupture thathecalls Sattelzeit. Thisdichotomic perspective leads him to confuse and place undert he same category (that of 'modernity')m anyv ery different modes of conceiving and experiencing temporality;a nd this confusion necessarilyh as consequences in the historical-conceptual recreation he proposed. In short,t op erform the very goal of Koselleck'sp roject of a Begriffsgeschichte-of preventing conceptual anachronisms and understanding the intellectual foundations of the philosophies of history-an umber of historicalp recisions are in order.
Foucault was, besides, more emphatic in pointing out the contingent nature of this 'modern' regime of knowledge,i nt he sense that,f or him, it is not only very recent,b ut alsoi tw ill not lasti ndefinitely. In fact,h eb elieved we were at the vergeo fi ts dissolution. That is what was implicit in his provocative announcement of the imminent 'death of man'.I na ny case, as we will see in this work, beyond the divergences of their contents, the convergencebetween Koselleck'sc onceptual history and Foucault'sarchaeology of knowledge regarding the nature of the conceptual break produced around 1800 is deeplys ignificant, and the attempt at matchingtheir perspectiveswill allow us to better understand what was the intellectual ground on which the philosophies of history were founded, and also how it eventuallyb ecame undermined, along with the concept of temporality that was at its basis.
The ideao fSattelzeit and the new consciousness of temporality AccordingtoKoselleck, the emergenceofthe philosophies of the history is indicative of afundamental break with respect to the premodern modes of historical figuration articulated within the frameworks of the Ciceronian concept of historia magistrate vitae. He pointso ut the two premises upon which that pedagogical ideal of history was based. The first of these is the idea of the iterability of history;that is, that the samebasic situations are repeated at different times, since onlythat assumption permits us to draw general laws applicable to every historical epoch. That assumption of the iterability of events made it impossible to conceptualize the idea of 'History' in the singular.What existed, in the context of that perspective,were 'histories',i nt he plural;t hat is, as eries of situations, events and phenomena, which are eventuallyrepeated in different times, places and circumstances, but which preservet heir basic structures and meanings.
The second premise highlighted by Koselleck is thatt he erao fe xploration (which opened the horizon of Europeans to the diversity of cultures on the planet) and technological progress finallytriggered the crisis of the pedagogical concept of history.B oth phenomena combined provide the historical basisf or the emergence of the moderni dea of 'progress'.Time would then have ad irectionality,which would make the iterability of history impossible. The future would no longer be readablei nt he experiences of the past.Agapn ow divided the 'space of experience' and the 'horizon of expectation'.B ut the fundamental fact thatm arked the definitive breakdown of the concept of historia magistrate vitae wasthe outbreak of the French Revolution, insofar as it affirmed, for Koselleck, the idea of the constructability of history;t hat is, it engendered an ew awareness of the subject'sa gency. Temporality thus became an immanent dimension-something that subjects unleash with their owna ction.¹ As Koselleck points out: "There always occurs in history more or less than thatc ontained in the givenconditions. Behind that 'more or less' are to be found men" (Koselleck 1985, p. 212) .The modern concept of history would thus arise from the combination of the ideas of progress of the Enlightenment with that of the constructed character of it determined by the revolutionary event.
In turn, the temporalization of history would allow us to place in sequential order the cultural diversity that the overseas expansion had revealed; that is, to place diachronicallyt hat which appears synchronously. The notiono fp rogress would provide the objectivep arameter for establishinga' before' and an 'after',s ituatinge ach phenomenon as ap articular moment in the immanent logic of the development of History.I tt hus gave rise to the idea of the coexistenceo fi nfinite temporalities at each single moment,t he simultaneity of the non-contemporary (Gleichzeitigkeit der Ungleichzeitigen). As Herder said in his Metakritik of Kant (a text that Koselleck repeatedlyc ites as the best synthesis of the 'modern' ideao fh istorical temporality):
In actuality,e very changingt hingh as the measureo fi ts own time within itself….N ot wo worldlythings have the same measureoftime. Thereare therefore (one can stateitproperly and boldly) at anyo ne time in the universe innumerablym anyt imes.² Lastly, the dissolution of the old ideal of historia magistrate vitae forces historical thoughtt oi ts self-reclusion. To the extent that the temporalization of historical structures prevents generalizationsand extrapolations between different epochs, regardingt heirc ontents, the idea of historical lawc an onlyn ow refert ot he empty forms of temporality;t ot he transhistorical conditions of change. It is here that Koselleck introduces what he calls the fundamental meta-categories that define the basic formso fh istoricalt emporality: 'spaceo fe xperience' and 'horizon of expectation'.The progressive distance between 'space of experience' and 'horizon of expectation' determines the acceleration of historicaltime, which is the hallmark of modernity.Thisallows him to establish afundamental historical law: the 'lawofacceleration',which states that change "occurs at increasingly shorter intervals of time" (Koselleck 1985, p. 314) .
In this way, Koselleck reframed intellectual history,i nsofar as he made it possiblet oestablish al ink between conceptual changes and concrete historical experience.However,atthis point some of his interpretations demand anumber of clarifications and precisions.The question ariseso fw hat led him to situate that rupture at asolate moment,which in turn led him to leave out of modernity the whole arrayo fp hilosophies that emergedi nt he sixteentha nd seventeenth centuries.F rom this perspective,t he line of thoughtt hat goes from Descartes to Leibniz, through Hobbes,L ocke, Spinoza, Smith, etc. should be considered as 'premodern',s ince they are all placed before the Sattelzeit;t hat is, they would be grouped together under the samec ategory as the philosophies of St.
Augustine or St.Thomas, which is clearlyuntenable. Furthermore, it contradicts what Koselleck himself remarked in his doctoral thesis (written in 1954 and published in 1959) , Critique and Crisis (Kosellek1 988). Lastly, thatchronologicali ncongruity makes manifest much deeper problems of ac onceptual order.
These conceptual problems send us back to the issue of historicaltemporality.K oselleck actuallyc onfusest wo completelyd ifferent conceptso fi t: the one implicit in the Enlightenment'sn otion of 'progress';a nd the idea of 'evolution', arising onlyl ater,duringt he nineteenth century.I ti so nlya long with this latter that time became conceiveda si rreversible. On the contrary,the most characteristic and determiningachievement of the scientificrevolution and of the Enlightenment,t hatm anyp lainlya ssociate with the comingo ft he so-called 'Modern Age' (although Foucault prefers calling it the 'Classical Age',t od istinguish it from the 'Modern Age' whose origins he places,i nc oincidencew ith Koselleck's Sattelzeit,around 1800) was preciselythe development of the notionoftemporal reversibility.T his notionw as perfectly formulated by Ferdinand Laplace( the leading astronomer of the late eighteenth century,who completed the Newtonian system) and symbolized in his idea of the 'little demon'.Hestated that one who was able to know the whole universe in its present state "would have the entire past and the entire future before his eyes."³ With this idea, Laplaceonlyled the Newtonian astronomical concept to its ultimatelogical consequences. According to it,t emporality is not ac onstituent element of the physical universe. If we could know the exact current position of all planets and stars, we could perfectly know wherethey wereathousand years agoand wherethey will be athousand years from now.The asymmetry between past and futurehere appears as merely as ubjective illusion resulting from the limitations of our cognitive capacities.
The kind of idealization that allowed seventeenth and eighteenth century minds to conceive of the world as lacking at emporality of its own was the culmination of as ustained and prolongedi ntellectual effort.I rreversibility was, in fact,t he most characteristic feature of the medieval-Christian notion of secular time (a notion that did not rule out the possibility of the mutation of living species or the spontaneous generation of new ones). Since every changei nt he world required providential intervention that marked ar adical difference between present and past,the idea of ah omogeneous temporalf low was still inconceivable.
The Enlightenment'si dea of historical progress as an accumulation of knowledge entailed,instead, continuity; that is, the assumption of ahomogeneous human nature providingaunitary substrate for this process. The idea of rad-ical mutation, bothi na nimal species and in culturalp rocesses, was completely foreign to Enlightenment thought.The breakdown of this lineara nd homogeneous conception of time leads us, in fact,b eyond the horizono ft he Enlightenment.F oucault'sa nalysis of TheO rder of Things is revealing in this regard, and allows us to introduce an umber of precisions into Koselleck'sp erspective of the Sattelzeit.
The archaeology of knowledge and the emergenceo fp hilosophy of history Although Foucault does not make it explicit,itisclear that the aim of TheOrder of Things was to rebuket he standard view of the link between modernity and subjectivity that was best synthesized by Heideggerin"The Ageofthe World Picture",and to introduce into it afundamental historical precision. UnlikeHeidegger, for Foucault the idea of 'subject' that Heideggerb elieves he finds in Descartes is in fact al aterc onceptual construction-one that would emerge in the nineteenth century,whent he 'Modern Age' (or the 'Ageo fH istory',a sh ec alls it) actuallyb egan. Foucault'sp erspective thus converges with Koselleck'si nl ocating the origin of modernity two centuries later than Heideggerdoes. However, unlike Koselleck'sperspective,F oucault'sdoes not ignorethe presenceofaconceptual break produced around 1600,a sH eideggera ffirmed, though Foucault disagrees with the latter regarding its content and meaning. He thus introduces ad istinction between the two.
In short,F oucault'sarchaeological perspective is more attentive than Koselleck'st ot he occurrence of ac onceptual break before the Sattelzeit,b ut,u nlike Heidegger, instead of projecting this break back in time, he remarks on the profound differenceb etween the twos ystems of knowledge to which they respectivelyg aver ise. In this way, Koselleck compels us to revise the dichotomous schemes-the either/or that articulates the entire tradition of the history of ideas and permeates also the perspectiveso fb oth Koselleck and Heidegger( either premodern or modern)-leading to the unification of very different forms of thinking underacommon label. Yet, as we shall see, we also meet here the fundamental shortcominginF oucault'sarchaeology of knowledge.Ifitis more perceptive of the conceptual transformations produced before the Sattelzeit,itmisses other,noless radical, transformations that took place after it.That is, thatnot all forms of thoughtand historicalviews that emergedafter 1800 can be considered as equally 'modern'-alack of acknowledgment of which also leads him to confuse and unify under acommon category very different concepts of historical temporality.Yet,i no rder to observe this problem, we must first to go back and see Foucault'sa rchaeological project and, in particular, his criticism of Heidegger'sview that associates modernity with the emergence of the concept of 'subject'.
In "The Ageofthe World Picture",Heideggerelaborated on the etymological roots of the term subjectum. As he says,i ti st he Latin translation of the Greek term hypokeimenon,t ow hich Aristotle referredi nh is Physics and Metaphysics. It indicates the substrate of the predication; thatw hich underlies and holds together all its predicates. In principle, all that (either athing or aliving being) of which something could be said is a 'subject'.The identification of the 'subject' with the 'I',i nitiated by Descartes,i sp recisely, for Heidegger, what marks the emergence of the modern world.⁴ With modernity,m an becomes the premise for the intelligibility of the world, which is then reduced to the condition of merely am aterial for its action.
This entailed,f or Heidegger, af undamental conceptual rupture.M an then separates from the worlda nd becomes the one who represents it and provides am eaning to it.I nt he Middle Ages, mana nd world wereo nlydifferent phases in the plan of Creation; the twop articipated in the order of correspondences of what is, which always referred back to their ultimateC ause (God). In antiquity, the world was not something to which the subject represented, but something that presented itself, which wass hownt ot he subjecta nd, ultimately, it was in the act of disclosing itself that it was constituted as such. Man and world thus co-belonged in the repraesentatio (etymologically, to become present) of what exists.
In TheO rder of Things,F oucault both discusses and takes on this concept, introducing to it afundamental distinction. What he calls the 'classical' episteme (of whose emergence Don Quixote serves as asymbol and expression) was born, in effect,o ut of the break of the order of correspondences. In the regime of knowledge that dominated until the sixteenth century,a ll that existed (the chain of being), including language, was conceiveda st he visiblem ark of that hiddenforcethat constituted them and renderedthem visible. The spaceofsimilaritieswould formasystem of 'signatures' for the unveiling of the hidden plan of Creation. As Heideggers aid, in this system of knowledge the world shows itself, and "all that remains is to decipher it" (Foucault 1970,p .2 
7).
 "However,w hen man becomes the primary and onlyr eal subjectum,t hat means:M an becomes that beingu pon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Beinga nd its Truth. Man becomes the relational center of that which is as such" (Heidegger1 977, p. 128).
By the end of the sixteenthc entury,thatn atural link-by which the visible immediatelyrefers back to its last,hiddensource-is broken, and words are distanced from things. Languageb ecomes an artifice to articulate the whole out of the fragments deployed on the surface of the visibleforms. The subjectnow has the task of reconstructing the logic of their dispersion of forms in the playoftheir similarities and differences. Things,t hen, no longer speak of anything beyond them, but refer to each other,tiedasthey are to the ground of Order thatdistributes them in the world and connects them with each other.
However,within the framework of this episteme, Foucault pointso ut,t here was stillnop lace for anyidea of 'subject' nor,ultimately, for the notion of temporal irreversibility (nor,t herefore, of History in the singular). Foucault refers here to the expression with which Hegel opens his Phenomenology of Mind: "everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimatet ruth not as Substance but as Subject as well" (Hegel 2003,p .9 ) . The 'subject' referred to here -which is no longer merelysubstance, as it was in classicaltimes-is areflexive concept; an in-itself and for-itself.
Onlyi nl ight of this could we properlys peak of am odern Subject (and,ultimately, am odern episteme), at least in the sense attributed by Foucault:t hat type of Being whose interioritygives rise to History,constituting adimension inherent in it.I ti s, more precisely, the premise for the conceptual transformation analyzed by Koselleck under the rubric of Sattelzeit. TheSubject,unlike the Substance, is no longer merelythe substrate of predication (that which remains immutable below the changes of form imposed upon it) but ad ynamic force; what defines it as such is the fact of containingw ithin itself the principle of its own transformations. Thisc onceptual redefinition is closelyl inked, in turn, to the emergence of the idea of the living organism as associated with the capacity for self-generation and self-development, which marks the transition from the 'natural history' of the classicala ge to modern 'biology'.The point here is that the emergence of this concept marks ar upture no less crucial than that which occurred two centuries earlier with the break of the system of correspondences. Heideggert hus confused twoc onceptions of subjectivity (and temporality) very different from each other,placing bothunder the common label of 'modernsubject'.Lastly, he would project back towards the sixteenth century aconcept that would onlye merge at the end of the eighteenth century.The passagef rom the 'natural history' of the Enlightenment to 'biology' illustrates how this later conceptual transformation occurred.
The idea of the subjecti nt he classicale ra was forgedi nafixist-preformationist matrix of thinking,which was at the basis of the 'natural history' of the Enlightenment.T he preformationist concept of the organism, which emerged in the sixteenthc entury and dominated the natural thoughto ft he seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, asserted that the forms of adulti ndividuals were preformedi nt he embryo. The gestation process was onlyt he growingu po ft raits and forms alreadyd iscoverable in the origin of thatp rocess. The fact is that onlythat hypothesis made possible the idea of an immanent,self-generateddevelopment.Onlyt he developments produced in the earlyn ineteenth century in the field of embryologyp rovided an ew model of 'organic' evolution. Karl Ernst vonB aer (the 'foundingf ather' of modern embryology) is the keyf igure in this processofconceptual redefinition. Accordingtothe theory formulated in his Historyofthe evolution of animals (1828and 1837), what would be preformed in the embryowould no longer be aset of visibletraits, but the principle for the formation of them; that is, ac ertain logical order of coordinatedt ransformations oriented towards the realization of an immanent purpose (something similar to what we call a 'genetic program'). Time, then, would no longer be acircumstance external to beingsb ut ad imension intrinsic to them. The 'subject' would then come to designatet his compound, thatw hich displays at emporality by itself, placing itself beyond the planeo fv isible forms as its hidden formative force. And this explains one of the phenomena that Koselleck pointso ut in relation to the modern philosophies of history:t he idea of the coexistence of plurality of temporalities. It is here also whereK oselleck'sc onfusion between progress and evolution becomes moremanifest,which leadshim to misinterpretHerder's expression.
ForK oselleck, the idea of the simultaneity of the non-contemporary that he (erroneously) attributest oH erder arisesf rom the possibility of orderingt he variety of realities existing in space in alinearsequence of development.Asheaffirms, the idea of historical progress allows us to identify what comes 'before' and what 'after'.This, in fact,i st he premise that lies at the base of the Enlightenment notion of the coexistenceo fp luralitieso ft emporalities-but not of evolutionary thought.When Herder said that "In actuality,every changingthing has the measure of its own time within itself… [and that therefore] no two worldly thingshavethe samemeasure of time"⁵,hewas preciselydenying the possibility of establishinga ny absolutet emporalc riterion-an objective parameter that allowed distinguishing the formerfrom the later.The plurality of temporalities derivedfrom the fact that, for him, there was not an empty becoming; apurelyobjective temporality,i ndependent of something (a subject) that evolves. Time becomes ad imension intrinsic to the subject; it is something that 'comes to beingsfrom within',toput it in Foucault'swords-afunction of the differential evo-lutionary process of organisms. In short, therei sn ot as ingle (objective)t emporality,but as manyt emporalities as existingbeings. We find here the nucleus of the historicist concept.History thus becomes areflexive concept; an in-and foritself; that is, a 'Subject' (whichi sn ol onger 'Substance',a ccordingt oH egel).
As we can see, within the period thatK oselleck designatesasSattlezeit,two very different views of time coexist.Y et,t here is at hird concept of it that becomes collapsed under the brand of 'modern time'.T he definition of the idea of the 'constructability' of history that then arises has av ery different meaning from that which Koselleck believes to find there. This leadsustointroduce asecond historical precision. His view of the relativity of time actuallyemergedlater, and corresponds to asubsequent moment in intellectual history.Heretoo, Koselleck'sdichotomous interpretative scheme pays its price, since it again leads him to confuse another very different concept of historical temporality,b esides the two mentioned above, groupinga ll three of them under the common category of 'modernity'.A ctually, within his perspective,wec annot think of the possible existenceo fc onceptual changes in the modes of experiencing historical temporality,e xcept in terms of the antinomyp remodern/modern. In fact,t he fundamental lawwhich, for him, governs the whole conceptual history of the modern age-the 'lawofacceleration of time'-allows us to perceive onlyquantitative differences; it would be onlyamatter of degree: what changed between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would be the measure of the interval of time in which changeo ccurs,a nd the sameb etween the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and so on. However,unlike the previous historicalprecision (between the ideas of 'progress' and 'evolution'), Foucault no longer serves as ag uide to understand how this new break occurred at the end of the nineteenth century.
The end of the 'Ageo fH istory' and the 'Death of the Subject'
In the concept of History that arose in the nineteenth century (which is the one that Koselleck analyzes), changea nd permanence are combined in ap articular way. Although for nineteenth-century evolutionary thought every fact was absolutelysingular (that is, unlike historia magistrate vitae,history now never repeats itself), it did not mean that the future was not somehow containedingerm form in the present as an immanent telos. It was thought that,inthe same wayasthe present is born out of the past,t he future must alsob es omehow alreadyc ontained in it as one of its potential alternativeso fd evelopment.T his imposed strict limits to the 'constructability' of history.That the subject 'constructs' His-tory does not mean that its actiondoes not obey,i nt urn, am ore general evolutionary logic that encompasses it.T his is preciselyw hat pavedt he wayi nt he nineteenth century to the thinking of History as as ystem (and led Hegel to speak of 'the work of history'). It would be even more appropriate to sayt hat, within this concept,i ti sH istory that makes man, rather than the other way around. A 'stronger' view of temporality foundedo nt he assumption of subjective agency involved the absolutec ontingency of historical development; that is, the radical constructivism of history.T hisv iew onlye mergeda tt he end of the nineteenth century,with the break of the evolutionary pattern that dominated the preceding century.The emergence of this new view of time marked aconceptual rupture no less profound than that produced in the period that Koselleck called Sattelzeit.
Ultimately, Koselleck incurs ac onceptual anachronism: just as Heidegger projects onto the sixteenth century ac oncept of the subject that onlye merges in the nineteenth century, Koselleck projects onto the end of the eighteenth century ac oncept of historical temporality thatactuallyemergedl ater,int he twentieth century.K oselleck'si dea of historical thinking as referringt oa ne mpty structure of temporality is the resulto ft he break of the evolutionary concept of history.The idea of the radical contingency of evolutionary processes then permeates the entirety of Western thinking,c rossingt hrough the 'great divide' between natural and social sciences. We see here the horizon of thoughtf rom which Koselleck'sv ery historicalp erspective emerged-and thath ep rojects back in time to the nineteenth century.
By the end of the nineteenth century,the view of systems as containing within them an immanent purpose-the unity between system and end-had broken, and onlythus the idea of the radical indeterminacyofh istory was born, and its cognateconcept of the agency of the subjectalong with it.The conceptual crisis produced at the end of the nineteenth century thus offers the ultimatef ramework for understanding the meaningofthe intellectual project around which Koselleck'so wn work unfolds. Heret oo, the referencet oaseries of developments produced in the field of natural sciencesreveals the emergence of that new paradigm of temporality.
Athen-newlyemergeddiscipline, electrodynamics, is indicative of the transformations occurred in the modes of thinking the historicityofphysical, and, by extension, social systems. In the theory developed by Maxwell and Faraday, magnetic fieldsa re no longer mere aggregates of elements, but sets of relations that form integrated systems of interacting forces. These systems appear as constellations of elements whose composition and recomposition are spontaneous and sudden, without obeying anyg enetic pattern of progressive formation. The notion of totality (structure) was then detached from thatofpurpose (function), thus dissociating diachronyfrom synchrony, the evolutionary processes from the inherent dynamics of systems,which would be oriented solelytowards theirselfreproduction, the perpetuationo ft heir own internal balance or homeostasis.
Ac onvergent path was followed by different disciplines, like biology. In 1900,H ugod eV ries gave the final blow to the nineteenth-century holistic-functionalist conceptions of evolution, paving the waytothe formulation of the theory of the 'Great Synthesis'.F or de Vries, evolutionary phenomena at the phylogenetic level resultf rom sudden transformations or random global mutations. In this way, mutations (change) are reduced to unpredictable, internallygenerated occurrences,but with no perceivable goal or purpose: even though they serve an adaptive process of the species to their environment,s election occurs only a posteriori,without anyi mmediate impact on genetic processes themselves.
These developments, as mentioned, contributed the rise of an ew paradigm of time. Non-teleologicallyordered processes, insofar as they involvet he occurrenceofthe sudden recombination of elements, break the linearityofthe developmentsofmatter.Each discreet moment in the sequence of the transformations operated in as ystem introducesareal novelty;that is, it entails the totalreconfiguration, according to an ew and peculiara rrangement,o fi ts constituent elements. Onlythen does the problem of the agential character of the historical subject emerge.
From the moment thatsystems lose anyinner teleologicalimpulse, anyprinciple to theirs elf-transformation, change, or contingency could onlyc ome from an instance transcendent to them; it would be the emanation of aBeing that preexists them, and allegedlyi nstitutes them. We thus getK oselleck'sc laim that: "therealways occurs in history more or less than that contained in the givenconditions. Behind that 'more or less' are to be found men" (Koselleck 1985, p. 212) . The subject'sa ction,which until then had served as the guaranteed for the rationality of the sequential order of historicalt ransformations, now appeared, on the contrary,a si ntroducinga ne lement of 'irrationality' that breaks the linearity of properly 'historical' processes-ac oncept that now,b ut onlyn ow,b ecame associated with the idea of radical contingency.The ambiguous relationship between Koselleck'si dea of modernity and thato fh is master,H eidegger, is particularlys ignificant in this respect.
The claim thatbehind all historicalchangelies intentional action would be, in principle, taking on the Heideggerian notion of modernity as the erainwhich man becomes the subjectum. However,ifwelook closelyatKoselleck'sclaim, the 'modern' subject to whom he refers no longer has anything in common with the one of which Heideggers poke. It rather meant its completer eversal. The self is no longer a subjectum,the unitary substrate that underlies the changes of form that are imposed upon it,b ut,o nt he contrary, the origin and sourceo fc ontin-gency in history.I ns hort, within the new episteme that was born at the end of the nineteenth century,i nw hose framework there emergedt he concept of subjectivity thatK oselleck retrospectively attributes to modernity as aw hole, the transcendental subject( intentional action) is no longer ag uarantee of order, and becomes the one that destroysa ll identity in history,which breaks the linearity of evolutionary processes and makes the radicallyn ew to emerge-that which cannot be thought from the present 'space of experience'.I ns um, it gave rise to thatw hich was unthinkable not onlyw ithin the frameworks of the Enlightenment'sidea of 'progress',but also of nineteenth-century'sevolutionary concept: the radical contingency of historical developments.⁶ As we see, Koselleck'sa ccount fails to avoid relapsing into the kind of anachronismst hat he attempted to prevent.T hisi nevitablyh as consequences in his historical recreation of the origins of modernity.O nt he one hand,i t leads, as we have observed, to establishing at oo drastic distance between the first modern philosophies of history and the Ciceronianp edagogicali deal of it; and,onthe other hand, it confuses very divergent social and historicali maginaries, placing them all under one common category (that of modernity). In fact,asIhavealreadypointed out,its fundamental lawfor understanding modern temporality-that of 'acceleration of time'-makes inconceivable the possible emergence of other ways of experiencing temporality that are qualitatively different to that which is at the basisofthe concept of History that emergedinthe late eighteentha nd the earlyn ineteenth centuries.
However,iti sclear thatthese historical-conceptual precisions are onlypossible within the horizon opened by Koselleck'so wn historical-conceptual project.Ultimately, the point toward which the history of concepts and the archeologyofknowledge converge(and of which that requirement of conceptual rigor is onlyaby-product) consists in the fact that they introduce ad isplacement of the locus of reflection. They cease to be philosophies of history,different to the rest but placed on theirvery same terrain, and become meta-philosophies of history; their emergence represents aturn to asecond-order level of historicalconsciousness, which no longer seeks to discover ameaning in history,but rather to understand what weret he precise historical-epistemological conditions thatl ed to imaginingsuch aproject-the historical-conceptual conditions for the inception of the very philosophiesofhistory;inshort,torecreate the underlying substrate of thinking upon which they werehistoricallybased, and how the particular concept of temporality implicit in them eventuallyb ecame undermined.
